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Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are a special form of 
public procurement that, under specific circumstances,2 
could be appropriate for realizing efficiency gains in 
the provision of public goods or services. On the oth-
er hand, due to current rules pertaining to public sector 
accounting and public finance statistics in most coun-
tries, PPPs can be used to hide public debt. In view of 
the perceived or actual deterioration of infrastructure in 
many countries, and considerable constraints on public 
budgets, there is a great temptation for politicians (and 
societies) to use PPPs not as an instrument to improve 
public procurement, but as a measure to circumvent 
budget restrictions.
For example, the statistical office of the European 
Communities (Eurostat 2004, 11) states: “Normally, an 
important aim of government’s long-term partnerships 
with non-government units is to avoid immediate capital 
expenditure, and related borrowing”. Not surprisingly, 
PPPs tend to be more common in countries where gov-
ernments suffer from heavy debt burdens,3 and PPP con-
tracts are sometimes concluded even when conventional 
procurement seems to be economically advantageous 
(e.g. House of Commons 2011, Rechnungshöfe 2011). 
The “price” for the latter policy is, compared to conven-
tional public projects, inefficiency and higher financial 
burdens in the future.
In this paper, we begin with an analysis of the current 
rules of government accounting and statistics. In a 
1 German University of Administrative Sciences Speyer.
2 The economic explanation of PPPs is strongly based upon theories of 
incomplete contracts (see e.g. Hart 2003; Iossa and Martimort 2012).
3 See for example Hammami, Ruhashyankiko and Yehoue (2006). 
Buso, Marty and Tran (2013) deliver up-to-date empirical evidence 
from France. They contribute the finding to the literature that while 
debt hiding is a relevant motivation, it does not seem to be the only 
reason for conducting a PPP. 
second step, we present some suggestions to improve 
these rules in a manner that will prevent the misuse of 
PPPs; and finally, we conclude with a short discussion. 
PPP and government accounting and statistics
Firstly, to understand the issues related to PPP and 
government accounting (i.e. financial accounting) and 
statistics (i.e. national accounts), we have to look at the 
(different) cash flows of traditionally financed public 
projects and privately financed PPPs. In a next step, we 
consider how assets and financial obligations (debt) are 
captured in business accounting, which provides the 
guidelines for government accounting in the accrual ac-
counting style. Subsequently, we describe the treatment 
of PPPs in national accounts. Lastly, we present several 
proposals for improving government accounting and 
statistics. These aim specifically to reduce or remove the 
disincentives that exist in current accounting and gov-
ernment statistics. 
Cash flows of traditionally and privately financed 
projects
Traditionally financed projects result in high public sec-
tor payments in the early stages of the project and low 
payoffs in subsequent stages. By contrast, PPP-financed 
projects shift payments of the public sector to later phas-
es. Figure 1 (similar to Funke, Irwin and Rial, 2013, 8) 
offers an illustration of this phenomenon. To isolate the 
effect of time shifting from other effects we consider a 
stylized case, ignoring differences in interest rates and 
efficiency.
a) If the project is government-funded then traditional 
financing (TF) in our example requires, for example, 
one million EUR in period zero. Under a PPP-contract 
the government has annual outlays of 100,000 EUR in 
years one to year ten instead. Therefore, under PPP con-
tracts, the government books show no expenditure (and 
no related deficit and debt) in period zero. The expendi-
tures appear only at the moment when the government 
starts to make payments. This always holds in a cash 
accounting style and, under specific circumstances, 
even in an accrual accounting style. Thus the described 
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mechanism offers a simple way to shift financial bur-
dens or deficits and debt to the future. 
b) If, instead, the project is user-funded, this means 
that users have to pay fees (tolls or the like) directly to 
the private contractor, meaning that the public budget 
is not liable for any payments. The project is virtually 
“invisible” in the public sector budget, accounting and 
accounts. Herein, the opportunity costs in the form of 
missing revenues in posterior years are also not visible 
in any way. This might be a reason why user-financed 
PPPs may seem extraordinarily tempting. 
Before governments come to a decision about a PPP, 
they commonly have to evaluate the PPP against con-
ventional project implementation. In project appraisal 
the discounted cash flow or present value usually serves 
as a decision criterion. The present value depends on the 
shape of the cashflows and the discount (interest) rate. 
Thus, it is no problem to construct PPP related cash 
flows with a present value higher than for conventional 
public projects (the present value of the cash flows usu-
ally has a negative sign).4
PPP in accrual accounting
Figure 1 makes it clear that countries with pure cash 
accounting may underestimate fiscal costs and risks 
arising from PPPs. For this reason we have to analyze 
whether accrual accounting offers a better, more com- 
4  Project appraisal is also vulnerable to manipulation. The audit 
courts in Germany, for example, frequently discover incorrect project 
appraisals (see for example Rechnungshöfe 2011).
plete picture. One important dif-
ference between cash and accrual 
accounting is the existence of a 
balance sheet in the latter case. 
In this context the question arises 
as to whether the PPP related (“un-
derlying”) assets and debts have to 
be disclosed on the balance sheet 
of the relevant public sector unit or 
on the balance sheet of the private 
contractor. From the point of view 
of a politician who is interested 
in hiding government deficits and 
debt, a so-called “off balance sheet 
treatment” is desirable – meaning 
that the assets and debt of a PPP 
contract should not be on the gov-
ernment’s balance sheet. 
The roots of the treatment of PPP arrangements in gov-
ernment accounting and statistics can be traced back 
to business accounting for leases. Leases fall some-
where between straight acquisition and straight rent. 
Purchased assets (and the corresponding debt) must 
be accounted for on the balance sheet of the purchaser, 
whereas rented assets have to be accounted for on the 
balance sheet of the lessor. Leasing contracts basically 
combine elements of purchasing and elements of rent. 
Therefore it is necessary to decide whether the assets 
and debts related to these contracts should be assigned 
to the lessor or to the lessee.
For that purpose, in business accounting a distinction 
was developed between a finance lease and an operat-
ing lease. This differentiation is based on the referred to 
“risk and reward approach”. In finance lease contracts, 
the lessee has all or most of the risks and rewards asso-
ciated with the ownership of the leased asset. Operating 
leasing, by contrast, is characterized by the fact or as-
sumption that the lessor bears the main risks and oppor-
tunities of asset ownership. In the first case the assets 
and debt have to appear on the balance sheet of the les-
see. In the second case the assets and debt are attached 
to the lessor. The determination of these two types of 
leases is independent of legal ownership. Underlying 
this approach is the rationale that accounting should re-
flect the substance, and not the form, of a transaction 
(“substance over form”). 
While the risk and reward approach has been used in 
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considerable dissatisfaction has arisen over time (Heald 
and Georgiou 2011, 221). Under existing accounting 
standards the majority of leases are not reported on a 
lessee’s balance sheet (IASB 2013a, 2). Therefore finan-
cial commitments and risks are not indicated therein 
and misleading information about the assets and lever-
age of lessees is given.
These shortcomings are the reason why the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) initiated a project 
in 2006 to alter the current standard for leases (IAS 17). 
In the meantime the IASB has presented a new approach 
(“right-of-use” model) and, in 2013, a revised draft for 
a new accounting standard on leases (IASB 2013b). 
Within this approach there is no longer a differentiation 
between operating and finance leases and, in principle, 
all leases have to be included on the balance sheet of the 
lessee. Both assets and liabilities are to be initially val-
ued at the present value of the lease payments. Thus we 
can expect the IASB to soon enact a fundamental new 
standard for leases. 
Private sector leasing standards say nothing explicitly 
about PPPs and are not directed at public sector entities. 
This lack of guidance on PPP accounting, despite the 
growing international importance of PPPs, led the IFRS 
interpretations committee (formerly IFRIC)5 to fill this 
gap in 2006 with the IFRIC 12 “Service Concession 
Arrangements” (IASB 2006). IFRIC 12 uses the crite-
rion of control instead of the risks and rewards approach 
due to the aforementioned dissatisfaction with IAS 17 
(see Heald and Georgiou 2011).
According to IFRIC 12 the economic, but not the legal 
ownership lies with the party that 
a) “controls or regulates what services the operator 
must provide with the infrastructure, to whom it must 
provide them, and at what price; and
b) … controls – through ownership, beneficial entitle-
ment or otherwise – any significant residual interest 
in the infrastructure at the end of the term of the ar-
rangement” (Heald and Georgiou 2011, 235).
If both these preconditions are satisfied, the PPP relat-
ed assets will not be reported on the balance sheet of 
the private operator. Using the criterion of control, it is 
probably the case that most PPPs would not be catego-
rized as private. For this reason, this approach will re-
sult in a significant modification of PPP classification.
5 The IFRS Interpretations Committee is the interpretative body of 
the IASB. According to the ISAB homepage “The mandate of this body 
is to review issues that have arisen within the context of current IFRS 
and to provide authoritative guidance (IFRICs) on those issues.”
But, IFRIC 12 is written exclusively for the private sec-
tor, meaning the gap regarding off balance sheet report-
ing persists for the public sector. Unlike private sector 
entities, public sector units could, for example, use the 
risk and reward approach, which would lead to the con-
clusion that PPP assets and debt belong to the private 
sector in an economic sense – the opposite conclusion to 
that provided by the control criterion. This would lead 
to arbitrage between different accounting standards and 
result in “orphan assets” and off-off accounting.6
This possibility was eliminated by the International 
Public Sector Accounting Standard (IPSAS) 32 
(IPSASB 2011), which is very similar to IFRIC 12 and 
also applies the control criterion. IPSAS 32 covers gov-
ernment-funded PPPs as well as user-funded PPPs. Now 
the symmetry between IPSAS 32 and IFRIC 12 prevent 
the possibility of off-off balance sheet reporting (EPEC 
2010, 23). 
However, the international standards will have legal 
effects only if they are voluntarily adopted by nation-
al authorities as now in the UK. In reality, most coun-
tries deviate from international standards (Funke et al. 
2013, 15). This means that the practical impact of the 
accounting standards on PPPs is very limited at the 
moment. This allows for gaming different accounting 
standards and hiding PPP assets und debt. Another im-
portant point is the fact that IPSAS 32 is not binding for 
fiscal accounting and reporting or national accounts. So 
there is a decoupling of IPSAS and the latter.
It should be noted that the European Community is try-
ing to implement a harmonized public sector account-
ing standard. The aim of this activity is to improve the 
quality and the comparability of the fiscal data needed 
to enforce the growth and stability pact of the Eurozone 
member states. In this context the statistical office of the 
European Community (Eurostat) has verified and advo-
cated the suitability of the IPSAS as a starting point for 
a Union-wide standard (EC 2013), now discussed under 
the headline-term “European Public Sector Accounting 
Standards” (EPSAS). Irrespective of the controversial 
discussion about the necessity and sense of such a costly 
standard for generating credible fiscal data, the adop-
tion of the IPSAS control criterion for PPP classifica-
tion would not be in line with the European System of 
Accounts (ESA 95). Thus Eurostat either has to adapt 
ESA 95 or to alter the IPSAS guideline regarding this 
6 In the UK there was indeed a real-world example of the absurd situ-
ation that enables an off-off balance sheet treatment of PPPs, resulting 
in PPP assets being displayed nowhere (see Heald and Georgiou 2011).
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point at least. The outcome seems to be open at the 
moment.
PPP in national accounts
In the following, we focus our analysis of national ac-
counts on two statistical standards. Firstly, we consider 
the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Government 
Finance Statistics (GFS); and secondly, we examine the 
European System of Accounts (ESA 95).7
IMF Government Finance Statistics (GFS)
The Government Finance Statistics (GFS), issued by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), is a macroeconom-
ic framework designed for compiling statistics required 
for fiscal analysis. This framework is described and 
commented upon in the IMF’s Government Financial 
Statistics Manual (GFSM) 2014, which is an update of 
the GFSM 2001. 
The IMF follows a risk and reward approach. As such, 
the economic (not legal) owner of a PPP’s underlying 
assets and debt is considered the party that bears the 
majority of the project’s risks and rewards. Some of the 
risks in acquiring the asset are determined by the degree 
to which the government controls the design, quality, 
size, and maintenance of the asset, as well as construc-
tion risks. Some risks associated with using the asset 
are supply and demand risk, residual value and obsoles-
cence risk, and availability risk (IMF 2014, 333). It is 
assumed that the macroeconomic approach of the IMF 
is broadly consistent with IPSAS; thus GFSM 2014 and 
IPSAS 32 should usually have the same implications 
(IMF 2014, 333; Funke et al. 2013, 15). 
Eurostat-rules for PPP accounting
The underlying conceptual framework for categoriz-
ing PPPs that is legally binding in the European Union 
is set out by ESA 95. ESA 95 constitutes the basis of 
7 The overarching macroeconomic statistical approach is the System 
of National Accounts (SNA) 2008. This system was developed and re-
leased collectively by the United Nations, the European Commission, 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, the 
International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank Group. The most 
important difference between the GFS framework and the SNA 2008 
is the focus of GFS on the impact of economic events on government 
finances – taxing, spending, borrowing, and lending - while the 2008 
SNA focuses also on the production and consumption of goods and ser-
vices. As a result, there are significant differences relating to the treat-
ment of own-account capital formation and the degree of consolidation 
(IMF 2014, 4). This situation may explain differences between ESA 95 
and GFS as well, because ESA 95 is harmonized with the System of 
National Accounts (Eurostat 2013).
the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP), defined by 
the Maastricht Treaty in Article 104, which is needed 
to constrain government deficits and the debt of the 
Eurozone member states. 
Eurostat also issued a detailed guidance on recording 
PPPs in national accounts (Eurostat 2004, 2013). Herein, 
Eurostat applied a risk and reward approach similar to 
the above-mentioned IAS 17 treatment of leases in pri-
vate sector accounting. The risk assessment of Eurostat 
concerning government-funded PPPs focusses on the 
following three main categories of risk (Eurostat 2004, 
2; 2013, 270-285):
a) “Construction risk” (covering events such as late de-
livery, respect of specifications, and additional costs),
b) “availability risk” (covering volume and quality of 
output), and 
c) “demand risk” (covering variability of demand).
If the private party bears a) the construction risk and b) 
at least one of the other risks (availability or demand), 
then the PPP related assets should be classified off the 
balance sheet of the government. 
When the risk analysis based on these criteria gives no 
clear picture (“borderline cases”) Eurostat reverts to 
additional criteria. These could be the clauses pertain-
ing to the disposal of the PPP assets at the end of the 
contract, government obligations for maintenance costs, 
repayment of debt in the event of early contract deter-
mination, the nature of the private partner (its special-
ization either in operating leases or in finance leases), 
classification of the assets (dedicated assets, i.e. assets 
specifically-designed to supply the service), and so on. 
The assets and liabilities of user-funded PPPs are con-
sidered to be private by Eurostat unless the government 
finances most of the investment or provides a mini-
mum-traffic or minimum-revenue guarantee to the op-
erator (Eurostat 2013, p. 265).8
The Eurostat interpretation of risk and reward differs 
from that of the IMF and has been rightfully criticized 
by several authors as “weak” and of a purely “formal 
nature” (for example IMF 2004, 22; Heald and Georgiou 
2011, 240–41; Funke et al. 2013, 15; Engel, Fischer and 
Galetovic 2014, 12). It is easy to align PPP contracts 
along the Eurostat criteria in order to obtain an off 
8 Eurostat draws a clear distinction between concessions and pub-
lic-private partnerships. In the former case most of the revenue of 
the private partner comes from the final users (therefore termed “us-
er-funded”). By contrast, under PPP contracts the majority of the reve-
nue of the partner comes from the government (“government-funded”) 
(Eurostat 2013, 264). This distinction differs from usual definitions of 
PPPs, which include concessions in Eurostat’s vocabulary.
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government balance sheet classification. The construc-
tion risk is to be transferred to the private partner in any 
case, and such partners typically have good opportuni-
ties to control this risk. Normally, the availability risk 
is also not a very demanding burden because this risk 
can be rather easily controlled by the private partner. 
In the end, the Eurostat decision actually creates an in-
centive to transfer the demand risk, inefficiently, to the 
private sector.9 The user-funded variant of PPP, called a 
“concession” in Eurostat’s terminology, could also eas-
ily be shaped to fulfill the off balance sheet conditions. 
Therefore, not surprisingly, experience shows that ac-
cording to Eurostat’s criteria, many, probably even 
most, PPP assets and related liabilities are recorded off 
governments’ balance sheets (Funke et al. 2013, 15).
Improvement of government accounts to reduce or 
eliminate the bias in favor of PPP
Several recommendations have arisen to improve gov-
ernment accounting and statistics, and thereby to reduce 
the persisting bias in favor of PPPs. We can divide these 
proposals (following Funke et al. 2013, 18–24) into three 
groups: a) applying stronger tests for PPP classification 
in fiscal accounting or a general ceiling for PPPs, b) 
improvements in budgeting for PPPs, and c) requiring 
supplementary information about PPPs in financial and 
fiscal accounting. 
Improvement of the classification of PPPs
Deficit and debt caps are usually set by “headline fiscal 
indicators” like fiscal deficit and debt (analogous to the 
Maastricht treaty). Therefore, a self-evident proposal is 
to introduce an unbiased classification of PPPs in order 
to prevent any unjustified exclusion of PPPs from cov-
erage within these indicators. In practice, this means 
the application of better and stronger criteria than those 
currently used by Eurostat or in ESA 95. Although not 
perfect, the usage of GFS or IPSAS criteria would con-
stitute a significant improvement relative to lax interpre-
tations such as those allowed for in ESA 95. 
In another approach, some authors (see Engel et al. 2014) 
have proposed always treating PPP assets and liabilities 
in the same way as public investments. This seems to 
be very similar to the new leases approach of the IASB. 
Then at least all government-funded PPPs would have to 
9 Risks of demand should generally be transferred to the public sector, 
because private subjects cannot effectively alter this risk and the public 
sector has more capacity for risk-bearing.
be recorded with their present value on-balance sheet for 
the government side.
Another reform possibility could be the establishment of 
PPP-ceilings. Funke et al. (2013, p. 24) highlight the fact 
that some countries have introduced ceilings for PPP, 
say three percent or five percent of net current govern-
ment revenue or of GDP. However, such ceilings would 
not necessarily remove the problem of keeping PPPs 
off-record or manipulating the underlying indicators 
such as GDP. Thus ceilings could only be an addition-
al measure taken along with one of the aforementioned 
measures. 
Improving the way budgeting deals with the fiscal 
implications of PPPs
The budgeting process provides another starting point 
for controlling PPP usage. Testing for value for money 
and the affordability of any project, including PPPs, is 
an obvious necessity and should be considered as a mat-
ter of course. However, the former is vulnerable to ma-
nipulation, while the latter requires information about 
the future fiscal impacts of a given PPP. For user-fund-
ed PPPs it is absolutely imperative to include shadow 
tolls, or the foregone government earnings, in these 
calculations.
All this information could be provided by disclosing 
the financial commitments incurred due to a given PPP 
over the period of its contract. The problems here are 
again manipulation, hiding this information in the ap-
pendices of the budget, and the non-binding character 
of PPP obligations for parliamentary decisions. Hence 
this measure could also only be an additional, support-
ing procedure. 
Disclosing supplementary information about PPP 
arrangements
Governments can, voluntarily or as required by law, 
provide additional information about PPPs to the par-
liament and the public. This may include, for exam-
ple, long-term projections of PPP related expenditures, 
shadow tolls, or other predictable cash flows between 
the PPP contractors and the government (see Funke et 
al. 2013, 19). 
Finally, governments could disclose PPP contracts and 
their details on their websites. Due to commercial con-
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fidentiality, it may not be possible to provide the public 
with all information on every single PPP contract, but 
in any case the financial impact of PPPs on the public 
budget must be released. For the sake of comparabili-
ty, the information given by the government needs to be 
standardized. However, the provision of supplementary 
PPP material on its own is not likely to have a signifi-
cant countervailing effect on the misuse of PPP arrange-
ments, as such information can only support budgeting 
and compliance with fiscal rules.
Discussion
Today the co-existence of several different standards 
for financial accounting and government accounts can 
be observed. The financial accounting standard con-
cerning the reporting of Public-Private Partnership 
(PPP) related assets and debt by private contractors is 
IFRIC 12 (named by the IFRS interpretations commit-
tee). IFRIC 12 uses a control approach (who controls 
the underlying asset?). The twin of IFRIC 12 applica-
ble to the public sector is the International Public Sector 
Accounting Standard (IPSAS) 32. Applying both IFRIC 
12 and IPSAS 32 would lead to a generally symmetric 
and consistent treatment of PPP assets and debt either 
on the balance sheet of the private contractor or on the 
balance sheet of the public sector. The control criterion, 
used in both cases, probably would assign most PPP ar-
rangements to the public sector. 
On the side of government accounting, designed for 
the purpose of generating fiscal data, we discussed the 
Government Finance Statistics (GFS), developed by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the European 
System of Accounts (ESA 95), which is directed at the 
member states of the European Union. These approaches 
apply different versions of the risk and reward approach 
(who bears the main risk of the underlying assets?). The 
stronger GFS interpretation has similar implications as 
EPSAS 32, while the weaker interpretation of Eurostat 
makes it easy to design PPP arrangements so that they 
fulfill the “as if private” criteria. 
The adoption of the accounting standards is voluntary, 
as are – in part – the standards for national accounts. 
Thus, there is a very mixed picture of PPP accounting 
in different countries. In the worst case the government 
and the private actors are able to play off private stand-
ards against government standards. As a result, PPP as-
sets and debt may appear neither on the private side nor 
on the public side (“orphan assets”). 
As long as the standards make it easy to shift PPPs to the 
private sector, or to nothingness, governments are very 
tempted to use PPP arrangements not to improve public 
procurement, but to hide deficits and debt or to circum-
vent deficit and debt caps, such as those established, for 
example, by the treaty of Maastricht. 
To close the existing gaps left by current accounting 
standards two kinds of measures are basically called for. 
The first action needed is the introduction of stronger 
and more consistent criteria both in financial accounting 
and fiscal accounting. For example, using the principles 
of EPSAS 32 or the “right of use approach” described 
in the new release of the International Accounting 
Standard (IAS) 17 would be a significant improvement 
compared to ESA 95. The second procedure needed is to 
improve the budgeting process. Before decisions about 
public projects (however procured) are made, value for 
money and affordability must be unconditionally and 
comprehensibly proven. The fiscal consequences of ex-
isting and planned contractual commitments must be 
shown, covering the complete duration of the contracts. 
Lastly, while additional information about PPP con-
tracts may be helpful, it is of minor importance. Such 
information will have no significant impact without im-
proved accounting and budgeting procedures.
Thus we cannot complain that there is a lack of suita-
ble means to address the current shortcomings. The 
main problem is that politicians and governments have 
to restrict themselves to a sustainable fiscal policy, and 
they cannot be expected to do so voluntarily. However, 
contemporary politicians could impose constraints on 
politicians in the future. The introduction of the “debt 
brake” (“Schuldenbremse”) in Germany is an example 
of such a path, one that could easily be emulated by oth-
er countries. 
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